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   ABSTRACT 
 
From being a poster child of microfinance development, Nicaragua became one of 
the nightmares for the industry. The negative influence on the countries‟ repayment culture of 
the  Non-Payment  Movement,  ambiguously  related  to  the  new  Sandinista  government,  is 
typically  blamed  for  the  crisis.  A  closer  analysis,  however,  reveals  that  features  of  the 
mainstream microfinance policies in Nicaragua are possibly more to blame for the crisis than 
the political turmoil, which opportunistically seems to have taken advantage of the underlying 
problems.  Overfunding  of  regulated  MFI-banks  and  promotion  of  excessive  competition,  in 
particular of these banks with the non-regulated MFIs, led to reckless lending and created over-
indebtedness.  Gradual  professionalization  and  conventionalization  also  led  to  the  erosion  of 
social embeddedness –once at the core of the Microfinance revolution- and left MFI weak in the 
face of political challenges. And the obsession with profitability and „finance only‟ implied higher 
interest rates and left many poorer clients with little or negative impact, lending credibility to the 
accusation of usury. While the Non-Payment Movement could be understood as a Polanyian 
countermovement  to  the  problems  created  by  market  development,  its  ultimate  political 
objectives  however  seem  to  offer  only  dubious  perspectives  for  future  inclusive  economic 
development.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite old and new scepticism (Mosley & Hulme, 1996; Weber, 2004, Dichter & 
Harper,  2007;  Bateman,  2010),  microfinance  was  and  is  often  praised  as  one  of  the  most 
successful initiatives of poverty reduction (Yunus, 2003; UNCDF, 2005; Campbell, 2010). The 
microfinance  sector  has  also  developed  into  a  worldwide  profitable  niche  of  the  financial 
industry. Mainstream financial policies, emanating from CGAP and multilateral agencies such 
as  the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  and  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank 
(IADB)  have  supported  this  evolution  vigorously.  IADB  and  IFC  have  published  from  2007 
onward an annual „microscope‟ of the worldwide climate for investment in the sector as one of 
the support initiatives of the commercializing industry. This annual document, elaborated by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, informs investors about the regulatory environment, the investment 
climate  and  the    institutional  quality  of  the  microfinance  institutions  (MFIs)  in  all  countries 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). The „microscope‟ also aims to motivate 
governments to adopt adequate policies that will succeed in attracting more investors to the 
sector. The report perfectly fits into the mainstream vision on microfinance, i.e. a full-blown 
niche  of  the  private  financial  sector  which  has  outgrown  its  childhood  of  non-governmental 
microfinance  organizations,  financed  with  donor  grants  and  subsidized  credits  from  social 
investors, and ready to take its place in the international financial system (Helms, 2006). The 
document  reflects  the  transformation  of  the  worldwide  microfinance  industry,  where  private 
investment funds gradually start to replace bi and multilateral investment funds, social investors 
and traditional donors, and in this way ensure the expansion of the microfinance industry.  
 
In the 2009 „microscope‟ report, Nicaragua stood on a 7th place in the ranking and 
even 4th in terms of the institutional development (level of competition, Credit Bureau, variety of 
services). According to IFC and IADB, Nicaragua was a top country for investors. Following 
such advice, also supported by the excellent rating reports for many individual MFIs, Nicaragua 
became  a  poster  child  of  the  international  microfinance  investors  and  industry.  Nicaraguan 
MFIs, consisting of three regulated MFI-banks and nineteen non-regulated MFIs grouped in the 
strong sector organization ASOMIF
[1], were especially  praised for their institutional capacity. 
The MFI Procredit, of German origin, with one of its first regulated divisions in Nicaragua, is 
generally considered a quality label in the international MFI-sector in itself, the MFI-bank Banco 
del Exito (Banex, “Bank of Success”) even carried an IFC-certificate of good governance on its 
website,  and  the  largest  non-regulated  MFI,  Fondo  de  Desarrollo  Local  (FDL),  won  several 
international  prizes,  including  the  2005  Inter-American  Bank  of  Development  Prize  of 
Excellence in Microfinance among the non-regulated MFIs of the continent as well as a Central 
American Bank of Economic Integration award for capitalization of small and micro enterprises. 
On the initiative of ASOMIF, a national credit bureau (Central de Riesgos) was created to which 
also the commercial banks and the MFI-banks (somewhat reluctantly) joined. One of the key 
attractions  of  Nicaragua  was  also  the  exceptionally  high  proportion  of  rural  microfinance, 
including substantial finance for agriculture and animal husbandry
[2]. The latter is certainly the 
                                                           
[1] In Nicaragua, there are two forms of regulated MFIs: MFI-banks and non-banking financial institutions.  
(The first are full banks, the latter have more limitations, i.c. in terms of deposits and savings. In this article, 
we use the term „MFI-banks‟ to designate both forms of regulated institutions.  
[2] Worldwide  there  is  a  relative  lack  of  rural  (micro)finance  in  general,  and  agricultural  and  livestock 
finance in particular. This is evidently a weak point in an industry which claims a central place as a strategy  
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merit  of  the  FDL  that  is  widely  recognized  as  the  pioneer  of  sustainable  agricultural  and 
livestock finance and has been the vanguard MFI for rural microfinance in ASOMIF. 
 
Private investors who were lured into making large investments in the Nicaraguan 
microfinance  sector,  either  by  the  excellent  qualification  of  Nicaragua  in  the  IADB-IFC 
microscope and/or the almost always impressive private rating reports of individual MFIs got a 
very unpleasant surprise in 2009 when the four largest MFIs lost 28.8 million US$.  In 2010, 
losses in the same MFIs totalled another 12.3 million US$, and investors ended up losing tens 
of millions of dollars in the bankruptcy of BANEX. In the 2010 IADB-IFC microscope Nicaragua 
is only outperformed in speed of descent in the rating list by the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
According  to  the  report  this  evolution  „was  mainly  due  to  the  negative  effects  of  the  “Non-
Payment Movement”
[3] on the regulatory environment and financing conditions for microfinance 
institutions  (MFIs)‟  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  2010:9).  We  will  argue  however  that  this 
diagnosis of the impact of the rebellion of (mainly Sandinista) microfinance clients is incomplete 
and that a critical analysis of mainstream policies also needs to be included in the explanation 
of the crisis and its consequences.  
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                          
for poverty reduction, given that about 70% of the world‟s poor population lives in rural communities and 
directly or indirectly depends on agriculture for its livelihoods (World Bank, 2008) 
[3] The official name of the „No Pago Movement‟ is the „Movimiento de Productores y Comerciantes del 
Norte‟ (Movement of Producers and Traders of the North). It indicates that it initially was a geographically 
confined initiative, which only afterwards spread to most of the country, be it that the Northern region 
remained its stronghold.   
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2.  MAINSTREAM MICROFINANCE POLICIES 
 
Up to 2009, the evolution and the policies of the bi- and multilateral actors in the 
Nicaraguan  microfinance  industry  largely  match  the  mainstream-paradigm.  This  paradigm 
states that MFIs must be upgraded to MFI-banks after an initial phase of institution building and 
be incorporated into the formal financial system (Helms, 2006). It is also considered a possibility 
that existing commercial banks could downscale through the creation of a microfinance branch, 
but this does not seem to happen all that often in practice, except for the massive expansion of 
credit cards carrying very high interest rates (over 70% annually in the Nicaraguan case)
[4].  In 
this  financial  systems  approach,  the  MFIs  gradually  come  under  the  non-prudential  and 
ultimately the prudential oversight of the financial authorities so as to guarantee the discipline 
and deontology of commercial practices. Moreover, this evolution also enables the collection of 
local  deposits  and  savings,  and  more  importantly  to  broaden  access  to  international  capital 
markets. In this way, it is possible to finance further growth with massive and relatively cheap 
new funds as well as to broaden the range of financial services (besides microcredit).   
 
In the Nicaraguan context, this mainstream philosophy was translated into concrete 
policy  advice  in  a  CGAP-CLEAR  report  from  2005  (Flaming  et  al.,  2005).  This  report 
acknowledges the great progress in the Nicaraguan MFI-sector, but it also disapproves of an 
„obsession with credit‟ and a lack of other financial services (i.c. savings), while several donors 
are  criticized  for  giving  subsidized  resources  to  targeted  rural  financial  initiatives.  The  main 
policy recommendation of the report argues for a coordinated donor policy in a financial system 
perspective,  headed  by  IFC  and  IADB.  This  implied  that  bi-  and  multilateral  donors  should 
stimulate the „mature MFIs‟ of ASOMIF to transform themselves into regulated MFI-banks
[5]. 
The  German  (and  indirectly  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  development  cooperation  through  their 
participation on the Procredit Holding) are presented as the example to follow because of their 
role in the conversion of the non-governmental MFI Confia into the regulated Procredit Bank.  
 
These  policy  recommendations  translated  into  broader  and  relatively  cheap 
funding  for  the  regulated  institutions  (Procredit  and  Banex)  through  bi-  and  multilateral 
investment vehicles (see table 1). Non-regulated institutions did not have access to these funds. 
Given the Belgian antecedents of the FDL (which was initially funded by Belgian donor funds), 
the  FDL  requested  funding  from  the  Belgian  Investment  Organization  (BIO)  because  of  its 
attractive interest rates, but was refused access for not being a regulated institution. Both Banex 
and Procredit received substantial investments from BIO. Similar principles and policies were 
applied by other (semi)public investment organizations as the Dutch FMO or the German KfW. 
The  multi-  and  bilateral  investment  sources  for  the  non-regulated  MFIs  (FDL,  Prestanic) 
reported in table 1 all relate to targeted rural development programs (criticized in the CGAP 
report), a special line of funding for microenterprises from a non-financial branch of the IADB 
and an MFI-fund from the CABEI (which is the only multilateral actor which apparently was not 
complying with the CGAP recommendations). 
 
The declared aim of this generous multi- and bilateral funding was also to crowd-in 
additional private commercial funding. To a certain degree, this is indeed the case particularly in 
                                                           
[4] In the Nicaraguan case, there were also a small number of special funds for credit to (not all too) small 
and medium enterprises by the commercial bank Bancentro. 
[5] See Bastiaensen & Marchetti (2007) for a more detailed analysis of mainstream financial policies.   
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Banex and to a lesser extent in FAMA. For Procredit, the private-public interaction takes place 
at the level of the mother holding in Germany, where at least until the recent microfinance crisis, 
a tendency towards a larger participation of private investors was apparently taking place. It is 
notable, however, to observe that the non-regulated FDL (as well as many others MFIs) does 
enjoy private commercial investments similar to those of the regulated MFI-banks, in particular 
of Blue Orchard, which is an important private investor in Nicaragua, among others also with 
significant investments in Banex. The exclusion of non-regulated institutions, applied by the bi- 
and  multilateral  actors,  is  thus  not  followed  by  the  private  investors.  This  provides  some 
indications  of  crowding  out  of  private  investment  by  the  generous  public  and  semi-public 
investments  (Abrams  &  von  Stauffenberg,  2007),  although  this  problem  seems  to  have 
decreased gradually.  The limited data in table 1 and additional interviews with ASOMIF  further 
indicate a significantly larger presence of social investors in the non-regulated MFI-sector. More 
detailed information for the non-regulated sector is not available, but interviews with ASOMIF 
institutions indicated that this tendency is even more pronounced in the other MFIs for which we 
do not have information.  
 
 
















Procredit  60%  30%  11%  0%  0%  0% 
Banex  22%  20%  13%  39%  6%  0% 
Fama  15%  20%  16%  23%  15%  10% 
Non-regulated MFIs 
FDL  13%  14%  36%  29%  2%  5% 
Prestanic  12%  26%  37%  8%  0%  17% 
 
Source:   Calculated from balance sheet data by Pablo Acarbar, quoted in Roodman (2010) 
* Multilateral institutions (IFC, IADB, BCEI) and investment funds supported by different bilateral donors 
and/or investment funds. In the case of Procredit, this includes investments from the mother holding, which 
is  a  joint  venture  of  different  bilateral  investment  funds  and  (less  prominently)  private  investors. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to distinguish between investments from specialized financial institutions 
and other multilateral development programs investing in microfinance 
**  Including  MFI-investments  through  the  Nicaraguan  public  investment  institutions  (FNI)  as  well  as 
development projects financed by bilateral donors  (Fondeagro, DECOPAAN, etc.). 
These figures also show that as a consequence of mainstream policies a certain 
dichotomy in the Nicaraguan microfinance sector has emerged. There is a „Major League‟ of 
regulated MFI-banks, that can count on broad public support and gradually (are to) become the 
playing  field  of  mayor  commercial  private  investors,  and  a  „Minor  League‟  of  non-regulated 
MFIs-NGOs, which have to rely on social investors and specific development programs, some 
of them expected to graduate to the „Major League‟ and others destined to survive on a small  
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scale  in  specific  niches  or  simple  to  be  outcompeted  by  their  more  efficient  and  powerful 
regulated competitors
[6]. Quite striking is the lack of coordination between the investors in the 
two  divisions  of  the  sector.  Bi-  and  multilateral  investors  focus  almost  exclusively  on  the 
regulated  MFI-banks,  where  they  are  directly  and  indirectly  (through  their  implicit  or  explicit 
guarantees of the quality of the institutions) co-responsible for a spectacular fast growth of the 
loan  portfolios  with  42%  per  year  (table  2).  They  only  engage  with  the  non-regulated  MFIs 
through  specific  projects  with  MFIs  who  have  decided  to  make  the  transition  to  the  Major 
League of regulated MFI-banks (ACODEP, FINCA)
[7]. On the other side, targeted development 
projects, social and private investors finance a complementary growth of loan portfolios with 
24% a year in the non-regulated segment. In this way, the total loan portfolio of the Nicaraguan 
microfinance sector tripled from US$ 184 million to US$ 559 million in five years time, while total 
clients almost doubled from 298,359 to 559,000 in the same period.   
 
Table 2: Loan portfolios of Nicaraguan microfinance institutions, 2004-2008 * 
(mio US$)  
 
  2004  2008  Annual growth rate 
Regulated MFI-banks: Procredit, Banex, 
(Fama since 2008) 
77  313  + 42% 
Non-regulated MFIs (Asomif): 19 MFIs  105  246  +24% 
Total portfolio  184  559  + 33% 
Total number of clients  298,359  503,201  + 14% 
 
Source:  Own calculations based upon information from Asomif and the Superintendencia de Bancos de 
Nicaragua (SIBOIF). 
* This table does not include the (mostly limited) portfolios of smaller financial NGOs and savings- and 
credit cooperatives, which with the exception of the Cooperativa 20 de Abril are not members of Asomif 
and  for  which  we  do  not  have  detailed  information.  One  of  these  savings-  and  credit  cooperatives 
deserves a special mention, i.e. CARUNA or ALBA-CARUNA as it is called today, which is allied to the 
Sandinista party and does manage a significant (but unknown) portfolio of loans and has probably also 
grown substantially in recent years with the return of the Sandinistas to power. 
Finally,  we  also  need  to  observe  that  the  Nicaraguan  government  is  almost 
completely absent in this microfinance story. All Nicaraguan MFIs are private ventures, initiated 
by religious development programs, local NGOs
[8],  or private for-profit initiatives. Only at the 
very beginning of microfinance in Nicaragua (2000) there was an initial capital donation from the 
                                                           
[6] As the „Minor League‟ players were not considered to be mature and competent financial actors, their 
regular  pre-crisis  complaints  and  warnings  about  irresponsable  behaviour  of  Banex  were  not  taken 
seriously by the relevant international financial stakeholders. 
[7] Mismanagement implied that the planned regulation of Acodep aborted prematurely; FINCA recently 
became a regulated MFI-bank.  
[8]  Some of these MFIs were created by former Sandinista functionaries, who lost their employment in 
government with the electoral defeat in 1990. Today, most of them seem to prefer to keep at a distance 
from active involvement in the current Sandinista government. During the negotiations between the MFIs 
and the Sandinista government in the context of the microfinance crisis this entailed a remarkable dynamic 
of negotiation and tensions among „friends from old times, but not (entirely) of today‟.  
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Nicaraguan government to a selection of smaller MFIs. At that time, also the commercial law 
was adapted in order to legalize microfinance operations as „loans among private agents‟. A 
general version of a specific microfinance law was adopted in parliament some years ago, but it 
was never transformed into effective legal provisions so it did not become operation until today. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  populist,  but  quite  voluntaristic  anti-usury  law  was  adopted  in  2001, 
introducing maximum interest rates for „loans among private agents‟. Since then, the Central 
Bank each month publishes an official maximum interest rate which has varied between 4,31% - 
23,27% per year. This law was quite detrimental for the transparency about credit costs, since it 
obliged  the  MFIs  to  introduce  additional  fees  (commissions,  separate  administration  costs, 
contributions  for  technical  assistance,  etc.)  in  order  to  be  able  to  recuperate  the  inevitably 
higher  transaction  and  financial  costs
[9].  Because  of  this  law,  the  MFIs  also  balanced 
themselves at the verge of a quite unclear frontier of legality in their operations.   
 
With  the  return  of  the  Sandinistas  in  power,  the  Nicaraguan  government  (and 
institutions  close  to  it)  also  returns  as  a more  active  provider  of microfinance,  first  with  the 
expansion  of  microfinance  through  the  Sandinista  credit  and  savings  cooperative  CARUNA, 
which is reformed into ALBA-CARUNA, receiving new funds from a solidarity fund linked to the 
Venezuelan oil deliveries. The new government also started an urban, subsidized microfinance 
program with the expressive title „Usura Cero‟ (No usury) under the control of the Sandinista 
community participation councils (CPC). And also the rural subsidized capitalization program 
„Hambre Cero‟ (no hunger) includes a limited financial component in the form of small self-
managed  community  funds,  although  it  is  not  entirely  clear  how  effectively  these  work. 
Furthermore,  the  new  government  –with  broad  multi-party  support-  also  recreated  a  public 
development  bank  (Produzcamos),  which  on  a  relatively  small  scale  initiated  operations  in 
2009.  This  new  and  changing  political  dynamics  will  play  an  important  role  during  the 
microfinance crisis of 2009 and actually brings the „horror‟ of the possible return of clientelistic 
state  financing,  strongly  repudiated  in  the  CGAP  report  (Flaming,  at  al,  2005)  back  to  the 
present financial scene in Nicaragua. 
   
                                                           
[9] In 2008, the internationally quiet efficient FDL had an average funding cost of  7,6% and administration 
cost of about 13,5%.  Even without the need for the provisions for default (less than 2% in the good years) 
and a profit margin (if only to increase capital and reserves in order to allow for the growth of the portfolio) 
the necessary average interest rate is already 21,1%.  (Before the crisis, the average effective interest rate 
of the FDL was about 28%, with the more expensive urban credits subsidizing cheaper rural loans (around 
24%)  and  a  specific  development  portfolio  aimed  at  rural  poor,  women  as  well  as  environmental 
sustainability (see Bastiaensen & Marchetti, 2011 for details).  
 
 
12 – IOB Working Paper / 2011.04  Crisis in Nicaraguan Microfinance 
3.  THE MICROFINANCE CRISIS SINCE 2009 
 
After  a  period  of  excellent  financial  results  and  spectacular  growth  from  2000 
onward, with only some minor signals of weakening in 2008 (Redcamif & Mixmarket, 2009), the 
entire  MFI-sector  entered  into  a  severe  crisis  in  2009.  Table  3  gives  an  overview  of  the 
evolution  of  the  total  problematic  portfolio
[10] for  Procredit,  Banex,  Fama  and  FDL,  together 
making up 69% of the total microfinance supply in Nicaragua at the end of 2008, in comparison 
with  the  indicators  for  the  Nicaraguan  private  banks.  We  can  observe  that  already  at  the 
beginning of 2009 the indicators of total problematic portfolio, with percentages between 4% 
and 8% were not quite optimal, and did not match the percentages of 1% to 3% of earlier years. 
During 2009 and 2010, the situation worsens dramatically with catastrophic indicators for Banex 
and  extreme  to  very  problematic  indicators  for  all  other  institutions,  including  the  private 
commercial banks (table 3). It should be noted that in particular the problematic portfolio of the 
two remaining regulated MFI-banks, Procredit and FAMA, remains quite high and worrisome, 
although  FAMA  together  with  the  private  commercial  banks,  both  concentrated  in  urban 
financing, show minimal improvements in 2010.  Procredit and to a much lesser degree FDL, 
both with significant productive rural portfolios, continued to register further declines in 2010. In 
other  words,  a  glance  at  the  following  chart  indicates  that  the  crisis  is    far  from    over  in 
Nicaragua. 
 




End 2009  End 2010 
recovery/decline 
portfolio quality (*) 
BANEX  39,4  Bankrupt 
PROCREDIT  13,0  14,7  -1,8% 
FAMA  16,4  13,7  +2,7% 
FDL  7,3  7,4  -0,1% 
Private banks  10,7  9,9  +0,8% 
 
(*) +/- of percentage share of problematic portfolio 
     Source:  SIBOIF, FDL 
Logically, these negative indicators translate in significant losses for all MFIs (table 
4).While the results for FDL and FAMA have improved during 2010, even when pre-crisis profit 
levels are still far away, the losses of PROCREDIT have further deepened. Paradoxically, it is 
the non-regulated FDL
[11] with a  loss of 2,5 mio US$ in 2009 and a small profit in 2010 which is 
performing relatively less poorly.  
                                                           
[10] We define „total problematic portfolio‟ somewhat unorthodoxically as the sum of portfolio at risk >90 
days, rescheduled and restructured loans, and loans with judicial action. 
[11] It needs to be observed, however, that the FDL in view of possible future regulation voluntary follows 
the prudential criteria of the SIBOIF for some years already.   
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Table 4: Financial results of four largest microfinance institutions, Nicaragua, 
2009-2010  
 
  2009  2010 
  US$ million  % portfolio  US$ million  % portfolio 
BANEX  -16,10  -14,0 %  -  - 
PROCREDIT  -7,75  -6,8 %  -10, 93  -12,5 % 
FAMA  -2,53  -8,5 %  -1,34  -5,8 % 
FDL  -2,44  -3,5 %  0,19  +0,3 % 
 
Source:  Siboif and FDL. 
These  dramatic  financial  results  forces  all  MFIs,  and  in  particular  the  regulated 
MFIs, to substantial recapitalizations. In the case of Procredit, the new capital comes from the 
mother  holding  in  Germany,  but  in  Banex  the  more  varied  shareholders  cannot  reach  an 
agreement about recapitalization, probably also due to a lack of faith in the future viability of the 
institutions  which  also  in  2010  continues  to  deteriorate.  The  Central  Bank  therefore  had  to 
liquidate it in the course of 2010. There is enough liquidity to return deposits and savings to the 
general  public,  but  international  investors  lose  millions  of  US$.    Even  though  it  is  not  yet 
regulated,  also  the  FDL  is  forced  to  improve  its  capital  position  in  order  to  comply  with 
international rating criteria, something that it has been able to do with the support of some of its 
traditional investors., especially in the form of expanded subordinated debt.  
 
It is difficult to find detailed information about the rest of the non-regulated MFIs. It 
is  clear  however  that  there  are  similar,  severe  problems  in  this  segment,  albeit  also  with 
significant variations in performance among individual institutions. For all the MFIs of ASOMIF 
together the PAR > 30 days jumped from 3% in 2007 to 20% in 2009 and declined slightly to 
18% in 2010. The total problematic portfolio was estimated at about 35% in June 2010   Some 
MFIs (i.e. Fundación José Nieborowski) ceased to operate in 2010 with great losses mainly for 
social investors. Others also needed recapitalization and most try to maintain their credibility 
towards  international  investors  by  strict  repayment  of  their  loans,  which  in  the  absence  of 
refinancing leads to drastic decreases in portfolios. As a consequence, the total portfolio of the 
unregulated MFIs of ASOMIF, other than the FDL, dropped by 33 % from US$ 177 million in 
2008 to US$ 118 million at the end of 2010. Contrary to the larger regulated MFI-banks and the 
FDL, the decline however already started in 2007 probably as a consequence of the increasing 
competition from the regulated MFIs. 
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Table 5: Evolution of total credit portfolios of commercial banks, MFI-banks and 
non-regulated MFIs, Nicaragua, 2007-2010 (in million US$) 
 
 
End 2007  End 2008  End 2009  End 2010 
% change 
2008-2010 
BANEX  125  139  115  0  -100% 
PROCREDIT  124  134  114  87  -35% 
FAMA  32  41  30  23  -43% 
Regulated MFI-banks  281  313  260  110  -65% 
FDL   53  69  69  62  -10% 
ASOMIF  211  177  142  118  -33% 
Non-regulated MFIs  264  246  212  180  -27% 
           
MFI total  545  559  471  290  -48% 
Private banks  1903  2019  1820  1927  -5% 
 
Source:  Calculated from data provided by the Superintendencia de Bancos de Nicaragua (SIBOIF), FDL 
and ASOMIF. 
It  is  clear  that  we  are  witnessing  a  drastic  reconfiguration    of  the  Nicaraguan 
microfinance landscape. The total microfinance portfolio has decreased by 48% from 559 US$ 
million US$ to 290 US$ million and we may fear that particularly access by the poorer clients 
has worsened most. In the case of Procredit, for example, a decision was taken to limit credit 
operations to clients demanding at least 2500 US$ (more than twice the average per capita 
income). The largest drops clearly took place in the regulated MFIs, who had experienced the 
most excessive growth during the Nicaraguan microfinance bubble, and logically paid the price 
for their rapid and low quality expansion which might also have eliminated higher quality pre-
bubble ASOMIF portfolio. The significant decrease in private microcredit supply is only partially 
compensated by the all in all limited expansion of finance by the Nicaraguan government, at 
least in the short run.  
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4.  THE MULTIPLE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 
 
As  we  indicated  above,  the  responsibility  for  the  severe  microfinance  crisis  is 
typically  laid  with  the  so-called  „Non-Payment  movement‟  of  revolting  clients.  Sometimes 
reference is also made to the role of the economic crisis of 2009: the negative growth of GDP 
with -1,5%, the fall in temporary employment in Costa Rica and of the remittances of permanent 
migrants in the US and Costa Rica
[12] as well as the crisis in the cattle sector (particularly in the 
Northern part of the country). A closer analysis however reveals that problems were also and 
perhaps primarily the consequence of the extremely fast and uncoordinated growth of the sector 
itself. The ensuing problems are an important underlying cause of the crisis, which provided the 
context in which the politically manipulated Non-Payment movement, as a symptom more than 
as the initial cause, had a great opportunity to become relatively successful. Furthermore, the 
legitimacy crisis of the MFIs was also related to the nature of the commercial, purely financial 
model  of  microfinance  that  is  promoted  by  mainstream  policies,  even  when  an  alternative 
approach might not have automatically solved all of the political problems.  
 
 
4.1.  Uncoordinated growth, cut-throat competition and over-supply of 
credit.   
 
A  first  element  which  catches  attention  in  the  above  analysis  is  of  course  the 
extremely fast growth of all MFI-portfolios, but in particular within the regulated segment (table 
2). Attracted by the reputation and the positive reports about microfinance in Nicaragua, the 
historically high profitability of the Nicaraguan MFIs (returns on equity of 20% or more were no 
exceptions within the regulated segment) and/or the significant rural penetration of the MFIs, 
international  investors  queued  up  to  generously  finance  Nicaraguan  MFIs.  In  the  process, 
everyone lost sight of the fact that the traditional urban MFI-markets were gradually saturated 
such  that  the  competition  between  MFIs  strongly  increased  and  several  originally  non-rural 
MFIs (including Procredit and Banex) also entered into agricultural and cattle financing. The 
logic of the „Major League‟ of regulated MFI with ample access to cheap finance and a „Minor 
League‟ of non-regulated MFIs which in time had to disappear, introduced an additional element 
in the competitive struggle. Especially Banex followed a quite aggressive competitive model, in 
which both personnel and clients of other MFIs were bought away through respectively higher 
wages and through new, more voluminous and advantageous loans. A story is known were 
almost an entire branch of Procredit was taken over by Banex, while not that far away from that 
place precisely the opposite occurred. In the rural sector, the pioneer FDL faced aggressive 
competition by the regulated and other non-regulated institutions, forcing them to become more 
flexible as well in order not to lose the historical clients that „they created‟
[13].  
 
                                                           
[12] It is estimated that more than half a million of Nicaraguan work abroad, mainly in Costa Rica and the 
U.S. The total population of Nicaragua totals somewhat more than 5 million inhabitants. The „export‟ of 
Nicaraguans  thus  became  the  most  important  export  item  with  somewhat  less  than  1  billion  US$  in 
recorded remittances.  
[13] Wiesner  &  Quien  (2010)  recently  argued  that such  negative  impact  on  microfinance  practices  by  
highly visible and thus overfinanced „leading MFI‟s‟ can be discerned more generally in the microfinance 
industry and poses a problem that funders needs to address urgently.   
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This  harsh  and  not  always  deontologically  responsible  competitive  struggle 
explains also why the credit bureau Sin Riesgos, started in 2007 by ASOMIF, was not a clear 
success until the crisis of 2009. Different MFIs chose not to report that they had „stolen away‟ 
clients  from  other  MFIs.  As  a  consequence,  nobody  had  a  clear  view  on  the  extent  of  the 
growing over-indebtedness of many clients. Competition and the pressure to transform the (all 
too) generous international funding into new loans also stimulated a phenomenon of multiple 
loans  and  recycling  of  debts  in  which  new,  larger  loans  are  used  to  pay  off  old  debts. 
Microcredit was sold  like “hot rolls”  and sometimes almost forced upon (poor) people.  During 
field research about female entrepreneurship and microfinance in Muy Muy, a student found 
several cases of small shopkeepers with three, four and even seven outstanding loans. One of 
the women told that she took loans because „the credit promoter was sympathetic and quite 
insistent‟ (Van Krieken, 2009). This anecdotic evidence does not seem to be an exception in 
Nicaragua, where almost everybody –including richer people from middle and higher classes 
follow the „American style‟ of living in debt and not saving
[14]. 
 
With all this, the Nicaraguan MFI-sector functioned increasingly as one big Ponzi-
scheme  where  the  increasing  resources  from  international  investors  were  used  to  capture 
clients from other MFIs by refinancing their old debts with these institutions. In this way, the 
international investors themselves contributed significantly to the excellent financial indicators of 
the  MFIs  which  further  fuelled  the  international  urge  to  fund  Nicaraguan  MFIs
[15].  In  other 
words,  the  abundant  money  attracted  ever  more  new  money.  In  this  way,  and  with  a  high 
degree of co-responsibility of the international microfinance funders, a real financial bubble was 
created which exploded during the economic crisis of 2009. As it is common during this type of 
crisis,  the  flow  of  new  funds  stops  immediately  and  everybody  became  distrustful  and 
increasingly rigid in the approval of new loans and the reclaiming of outstanding debts (both at 
the level of the international investors as well as the MFIs towards their clients).  It explains why 
we see an explosion of judicial actions against defaulters, including confiscations of collateral 
and even imprisonment, from the end of 2008 onwards, and why in a reaction to this the Non-
Payment movement could capitalize on its discourse of inhumane treatment of clients for the 
„profit motives‟ of the MFIs.  
 
 
4.2.  Conventionalisation and legitimacy problems 
 
Coupled to the all too generous financing of the Nicaraguan „success story‟ (sic) is 
a promotion of what we would call a „European-American model of professional commercial 
banking‟. With this, we mean to indicate that contrary to the initial principles and methodologies 
of microfinance there is a growing reliance on contractual loan arrangements and courts as a 
means to guarantee repayment. Where initially the microfinance revolution was based upon 
contractual  innovations  as  group  loans  with  peer  selection  and  monitoring  (social  pressure) 
(Morduch, 1999; Varian, 1990) as well as principles of social proximity (Labie, 1999) in order to 
guarantee the legitimacy and viability of the credit contract, one has started to rely increasingly 
on individual contracts and legal guarantees with hard collateral (pledges, even mortgages). 
                                                           
[14] It is therefore quite justified that people insist on the need for basic financial education for everyone in 
the current context (Vega in La Prensa, 6 september 2010). 
[15] A quite similar process took place in 2009 in Morocco, Pakistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chen et al., 
2010) and more recently in Andra Pradesh, India. (CGAP, 2010)  
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This has weakened the social embeddedness of MFIs in the institutionally difficult rural context 
of  Nicaragua,  especially  for  latecomers  like  Banex  and  Procredit,  but  also  for  other  more 
traditional MFIs under the pressure of upscaling and stringent efficiency targets, which require 
the number of clients per credit promoter to rise to over 400 per year.  
 
During the crisis in 2009, many MFIs and the international investors even more so 
argued strongly –including a fruitless public call upon the  Nicaraguan president- to respect the 
„Rule of Law‟ in order to guarantee contractual obligations. One problem was that there were 
also some remarks to be made about the „legal‟ practices of some of the MFIs. There was, for 
example, one particular court where an MFI-friendly judge almost systematically ruled in favor of 
the MFIs such that many cases against defaulters were concentrated there. Above we have 
also already noticed that since the anti-usury law of 2001, the MFIs were operating in a grey 
area as to the legality of their operations, because it was not possible to cover all of their costs 
through the maximum interest rate. This did not contribute to contractual transparency and often 
the client could  not -  even after a detailed study  -  find out  which costs she was precisely 
paying. Sandinista judges, sympathizing with the Non-Payment movement, therefore often had 
little  difficulty    in  cancelling  repayment  obligations  due  to  the  alleged  illegality  of  the 
transactions. The important conclusion here is that in countries, like Nicaragua, with a weak 
legal-institutional framework an almost exclusive reliance on courts to guarantee contractual 
arrangements and repayment place MFIs –no matter how „professional‟ they may be- in a very 
fragile position once the legitimacy of their operations and existence is locally questioned
[16].  
This is precisely what happened to the aggressive Banex
[17] and to a lesser extent the other 
MFIs,  with  the  known  dramatic  consequences.  The  MFIs  important  contribution  to  the 
restoration  of  the  repayment  culture  after  the  disastrous  years  of  the  first  Sandinista 
administration (1979-1990) has all but disappeared and will need to be rebuild through the re-
establishment of qualitative MFI-client relationships  
 
It  is  no  coincidence  that  those  MFIs  with  a  relatively  stronger  social 
embeddedness, like the historical pioneer FDL and a handful of locally embedded MFIs, have 
done relatively better during the crisis, since they have been more successful in defending the 
local  legitimacy  of  their  operations.  Since  2008,  the  FDL  has  also  engaged  in  an  intensive 
discursive struggle to defend its local legitimacy, among others with a series of local meeting 
with clients at the level of rural hamlets. There they try to explain that sustainable microfinance 
requires  regular  and  timely  repayment  and  (without  subsidies)  has  to  charge  relatively  high 
interest rates. With their slogan „Cuida tu record‟ (take care of your record on file) they also 
argue  with  relative  success  that  repayment  is  also  in  the  interest  of  the  clients  as  her/his 
historical credit record defines the conditions of access to future credit
[18]. Surprisingly, there 
                                                           
[16] The recent crisis in Andra Pradesh sheds more light on this issue.  Also there, the MFIs dramatically 
lost their legitimacy in the context of a similar microfinance bubble, but also as a consequence of general 
indignation with the „successful‟ IPO of the commercial MFI SKS, enriching its original shareholders after 
the sale of the shares in the stock-market, and the news about the excessive wages for the „professional‟ 
CEO (CGAP, 2010).  
[17] In a conversation with the leadership of the Non-Payment Movement in December 2010 they made a 
empathic difference between Banex („a real monster‟) and the other MFIs (which they didn‟t like much 
either). It is interesting to note that precisely an institution which had a certificate of „good governance‟ of 
the IFC on its website faced such severe legitimacy problems.  
[18]  The  success  of  this  strategy  also  hinges  on  securing  sufficient  new  funds  in  order  to  continue 
honouring  the  implicit  commitments  to  historical  clients  with  a  clean  credit  record.  The  tendency  of  
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were  only  few  other  MFIs  who  have  engaged  in  such  systematic  confrontations  with  their 
clients. At the same time, it needs to be noted that the FDL did not want to take an excessively 
rigid stance vis-à-vis its clients in the many cases with objective repayment problems, especially 
in the cattle sector (see further), where many restructured loans have been allowed
[19]. This did 
not  imply  however  that  the  FDL  was  more  flexible  with  the  members  of  the  Non-Payment 
movement, quite the contrary, and in particular not with some of their leaders with relatively 
large debts with the FDL and unwilling to negotiate about restructuring, Actually, one of the 
more violent confrontations between the Non-Payment movement and the MFIs during the crisis 
took place around the FDL in rural Matiguás
[20].  
 
Fundamentally,  however,  this  discursive  struggle  for  the  legitimacy  of  credit 
transactions of MFIs is not really new in the Nicaraguan rural context. In an investigation of 
2001 about the success and the failure of the „Bancos Locales‟ (today the FDL) in two similar 
villages near Masaya, we documented how the credit promoters needed to challenge the logic 
and practices of local clientelistic political leaders
[21] (Bastiaensen & D‟Exelle, 2002). They also 
argued, then in the context of a local drought -and just as today inspired by electoral ambitions- 
that the poor clients were not able and should therefore not be asked to repay, and that they 
would offer them their protection as patrons (and logically in exchange of their votes). In the 
relatively poorer village, the FDL lost the discursive struggle and the seed capital of the village 
bank  was  appropriated  by  the  local  leaders  and  disappeared  in  a  very  short  time.  Only  a 
number  of  repaying  individual  clients  were  later  reincorporated  in  the  FDL  through  another 
branch; in the other villages, the repayment discipline was maintained and the relations with the 
FDL continue until today. A similar struggle took place in 2005 between the FDL and the local 
Sandinista leadership around the municipality of Somotillo. At that time, the FDL managed to 
mobilize their client base to undermine the legitimacy of the deliberately defaulting Sandinista 
leaders and therefore to wither away the political attack on credit culture
[22]. 
 
These experiences show that MFIs in Nicaragua aiming at financial sustainability  
must find ways to deal with the omnipresent -Sandinista as well as liberal-clientelistic networks 
and must try to appeal on those elements of the rural institutional context which support the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
international investors to retreat fully from the Nicaraguan market, despite their obvious co-responsibility in 
the emergence of the crisis, does not contribute to strengthen Nicaraguan MFIs in their struggle to win this 
battle  for  credit  culture.  (There  are  obviously  collective  action  problems,  and  in  particular  tendencies 
towards free riding among the different funders, which are at play here.) 
[19] As indicated above, the FDL was also aware of its co-responsibility for the over-indebtedness of some 
of its clients. 
[20] Bullets were fired at credit promoters, mortar grenades thrown at the local bank managers house, a 
car put to fire, and the personnel and clients taken hostage and threatened with gasoline in the local 
branch. 
[21]  They  also  belonged  to  the  Sandinista  party  in  this  village.  Authoritarian  clientelistic  practices  are 
however not the monopoly of the Sandinista party as the No Pago movement with its many liberal and 
even ex-contra (and therefore anti-Sandinista) leaders has proven.   
[22]  Some  hypothesize  that  during  the  national  Non-Payment    Movement,  the  Sandinista‟s  harsher 
treatment of the FDL (destroying vehicles and even using a bazooka against the home, wife, and children 
of branch manager) is due not only to their awareness of the FDL‟s  embeddedness among small rural 
producers.  The  Sandinista  movement  considers  that  they  alone  should  have  access  to  the  poor  and 
excluded. Thus, they treat enemies at the grass roots level more harshly than the private sector with whom 
they enter into “mutually beneficial” entrepreneurial pacts. The other hypothesis is that the Sandinistas 
consider the leaders of the FDL, who were once Sandinistas, “traitors to the cause.” One of the steadfast 
rules of mafia like Sandinista organization is “Never forget or pardon treason from inside.”  
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microfinance market, such as a (rather individualistic and subsidy-hostile) work ethos, the desire 
for autonomy (despite often evident dependence), the ideology of the market and the respect for 
the law and a given word. They also indicate that microfinance is in fact much more and should 
be much more than only contract innovation and professional banking; it is about the change of 
the dominance of inherited authoritarian-clientelistic rural governance structures and their (non-
contractual) rules of the game, which on a much more fundamental level relate to the highly 
unequal,  segmented  Nicaraguan  society.  This  requires  being  involved  in  the  mutual 
construction of new rural subjectivities as well as associated contractual rules and practices that 
support  autonomy  and  more  equal  exchange,  substituting  for  the  lopsided  dependency  of 
patron-client relationships. 
 
From a Polanyian notion of markets as an instituted process (Rankin, 2008: 1967), 
we  argue that MFIs have to face the creation of the social conditions for the functioning of a 
financial market. And as O‟Neill (2001:710) has argued in other contexts: „(t)o invoke “market 
solutions”  is  to  invoke  a  particular  distribution  of  power  to  determine  outcomes  .  .  . market 
solutions are mechanisms for defining and defending particular distributions of social power, 
and  should  be  understood  and  contested  as  such‟.  Contesting  the  functioning  of  the 
microfinance market is precisely what the Non Payment movement in Nicaragua have done and 
the future of the MFIs will therefore to a large extent depend on their success in countering this 
contestation. In order to do so, the MFIs need to weather through the complex social landscape 
of  rural  Nicaragua,  which  such  as  any  social  life  is  „build  upon  a  variety  of  (incoherent) 
discourses  and  rules  of  the  game,  connected  to  a  varied  landscape  of  networks  and 
organizations‟ (Long, 2001), and in which through an „institutional bricolage‟ (Cleaver, 2001) 
with  suitable  elements  of  that  same  landscape  a  more  solid,  and  also  locally  institutionally 
embedded framework for microfinance transactions with the clients needs to be created.  In our 
view,  rural  microfinance  is  precisely  relevant  for  bringing  the  required  rural  transformation 
because of this much more fundamental potential for broader institutional change, even when 




4.3.  Limitations of 'Finance Only'  
 
An important aspect of the struggle for local legitimacy is evidently related to the 
main accusation of the rebel clients that MFIs are solely interested in making excessive profits 
from their financial business, charging illegally high interest rates and thereby benefiting from 
the poverty and desperation of their clients without bothering about possible negative social 
impact
[23]. The traditional defence of the MFIs is of course that both the cost of funding and 
transaction costs are very high in microfinance and that profits are needed to grow and service 
more clients (Rosenberg, et al, 2009; Guérin, et al., 2009; Romero quoted in La Primerisima, 
2008).  Furthermore,  many  MFIs  also  have  engaged  themselves  with  the  so-called  double 
bottom  line  and  aim  to  achieve  both  financial  and  social  performance.  Social  performance 
management (SPM), i.e. a systematic monitoring of policies in view of stated social objectives, 
                                                           
[23] “The microfinance institutions confiscate our properties, impose usurious interest rates, they put us in 
jail; we producers are in crisis while they make money and do not want to negotiate.” (O. Gonzales, main 
debtors´ leader talking through Radio Segovias, July 23
th 2008, our translation).  
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is very high on the (inter)national agenda of the MFI-sector
[24]. Financed for this purpose by the 
Dutch NGO Hivos, Banex was acknowledged as one of the pioneers of SPM in Nicaragua. 
However, SPM did not really turn out to be much more that a small layer of social varnish for a 
fundamentally financial business. In our view, its elemental flaw is that it does not provide an 
adequate solution to the lack of impact of an exclusive focus on „finance only‟. 
 
One  can  actually  observe  an  interesting  and  all  but  innocent  shift  in  the 
mainstream  discourses  about  microfinance. Whereas  in  the  initial  days,  the  narratives  were 
about  credit  constrained  micro-entrepreneurs,  who  by  gaining  access  to  credit  had  the 
opportunity to grow and find a way out of poverty, today one speaks more and more about poor 
households, surviving in insecure and volatile environments, who through their access to credit 
and  savings  increase  their  possibilities  to  better  manage  their  vulnerability.  This  is  also 
connected to increasing scepticism about the social impact of microfinance, which seems to 
have  been  exaggerated  in  earlier  years,  especially  among  poor  clients,  which  are  often 
excluded any way (Dichter & Harper, 2007). It should evidently not come as a surprise that 
microfinance alone is often not sufficient to produce significant social impact and that the latter 
is at least co-dependent on broader changes in the institutional context of economy and society, 
including opportunities for complementary interventions and services. The crucial point is that 
mainstream policies and most MFIs remain (or increasingly become) exclusively focused on 
their financial operations and in the face of this disappointing social impact do not see this as an 
incentive to develop a more active strategy of articulating financial with non-financial services as 
well as social movements and organizations in a so-called „Finance Plus‟ approach. The role of 
the MFIs is defined as that of a passive actor, taking note of existing demand and trying to 
match the solvent part of that demand in today‟s‟ real economy, without aiming to play a more 
active role in the creation (and financing) of better conditions for the economic development of 
their poorer clients (see also Bastiaensen & Marchetti, 2011).  
 
In  an  alternative  vision,  which  we  coin  as  the  transformative  Finance  Plus 
approach, rural microfinance –as an operationally independent and commercially sustainable 
operation  or  enterprise-  becomes  articulated  with  other  interventions  and  socio-political 
dynamics in view of a broader process of institutional change in the rural economy. In such a 
perspective,  rural  microfinance  is  connected  to  the  development  and  deepening  of  social 
inclusiveness of value chains and  the gradual transformation of ecologically  destructive and 
unsustainable land and animal husbandry practices, possibly articulating with new opportunities 
within  the  emerging  international  climate  mitigation  policies  (i.e.  the  so-called  Payments  for 
Environmental Services (Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2009)). To achieve such an approach 
inevitably requires the creation of alliances with relevant poor and less poor social groups and 
institutional actors, with the local, national and even international capacity to contribute to more 
fundamental structural transformations of rural institutions
[25].   
 
Such broader dynamics are not only  important for the ultimate social  impact of 
microfinance on its (poor) clients, but also –and even crucially- for the financial health of the 
                                                           
[24]  See  e.g.  the  website  of  the    Social  Performance  Task  Force,  http://sptf.info/  or  of  the  Central 
American site of Proyecto Misión: http://mision.redcamif.org/en/spm-forum/?L=6. 
[25] See Bastiaensen & Marchetti (2011) for a descriptive analysis of an emerging integrated social and 
ecological  strategy  for  value  chain  development  of  the  FDL  in  cooperation  with  its  university  partner 
Nitlapan and other actors in the cattle sector of Nicaragua.   
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MFIs themselves. The specific problems in the cattle sector during the 2009 crisis illustrate this 
perfectly. In normal conditions, cattle raising and particularly the fattening of livestock, is quite 
profitable  in  Nicaragua  (partly  also  because  of  the  unsustainable  exploitation  of  extensive 
pastures, expanding through continuing, albeit slowing deforestation at the agricultural frontier). 
In 2008, the top year of Nicaraguan Microfinance, prices for meat and live animals attained 
unprecedented heights. Unsurprisingly, a large part of the rural portfolio of MFIs and MFI-banks 
was loaned out to cattle ranchers of all sizes. Yet, in 2009 average meat prices in the national 
slaughterhouses  decreased  with  about  20%,  whereas  the  prices  of  live  animals  –which  are 
normally produced by the smaller and medium-sized cattle producers and then „finished‟ by rich 
ranchers with huge farms for extensive cattle ranching- were hit with a drop of more than 50%, 
especially in the Northern  part of the country (where the Non-Payment movement originated).  
An  initial  reason  for  this  differential  evolution  were  problems  in  the  Mexican  cattle  sector, 
working on the basis of imported corn from the US, which ran into profitability problems as a 
consequence of rising yellow corn prices, in part due to subsidized transformation of US corn, 
previously exported at a much cheaper price to Central America, into the agro-fuel ethanol
[26]. 
The  fall  in  Mexican  demand  for  live  animals  (and  thus  of  Mexican  and  Salvadoran  traders 
buying  live  animals  in  the  Northern  rural  areas  of  Nicaragua)  dramatically  reduced  local 
competition  for  these  animals  ,  substantially  improving  the  negotiating  power  of  the  larger 
fatteners-traders.  Furthermore,  implementation  in  2008  of  the  second  phase  of  CAFTA 
international free trade regulations prohibiting the export of live animals below 330kg –a means 
to favor national slaughterhouses- contributed to the demise of the live animals chain to which 
the smaller producers were connected in a relatively more beneficial way. It is significant that 
meat prices in the slaughterhouse today returned to their historical level, whereas local prices 
for live animals continue to be depressed. A policy aimed at making the cattle chains more 
socially inclusive as well as ecologically sustainable requires a panoply of measures besides 
microfinance:    investments  in  smaller-scale,  silvopastoral  intensification,  possibly  the 
introduction  of  environmental  subsidies  (or  Payments  for  Ecosystem  Services)  as  well  as 
changes in the underlying socio-political power relations which do not permit smaller producers 
to get a fair, proportional share of value added in the agricultural chains. MFIs who passively 
follow solvent demand inevitably risk ending up financing both further economic concentration 
and  environmental  destruction  based  upon  the  existing  model  of  extensive  cattle  raising.  In 
such a difficult contexts, MFIs who only focused on their financial operations and did proceed to 
aggressive collection policies of loan arrears faced substantial incomprehension and political 
resistance. The question here is however to where such resistance leads and whether is brings 
the desired dynamics of inclusive economic development and democratic rural governance any 








                                                           
[26] Yellow corn reached its highest price in US (and NAFTA) markets in June 2008 (287 US$/MT), rising 
from  110  US$/MT  in  June  2006  over  165  US$/MT  in  June  2007  (Source:  USDA  Market  News).  The 
significant  role  of  US  ethanol  policies  in  this  rising  corn  price  scenario  is  documented  in  (Randall 
Fortenbery & Park, 2008).  
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4.4.  A Closer Look at the Non Payment Rebellion 
 
 The origin of the current Non-Payment movement can be situated in the beginning 
of 2008, i.e. quite some time before the outbreak of the Nicaraguan economic crisis in 2009, 
with a series of imprudent loans of particularly Banex, Procredit and some commercial banks in 
the Northern Department of Nueva Segovia
[27]. These were mainly larger loans (up to 50,000 
US$) provided by these two MFI-banks in the framework of their strategy to start operations in 
the  rural  sector  with  which  they  were  relatively  unacquainted.  Since  these  loans  were 
guaranteed with solid legal guaranties (pledged cattle branded with the iron of the bank as well 
as mortgaged buildings and titled land) they did not bother much about possible repayment 
problems. Most of these clients had a Sandinista background
[28], some of them in the military 
and in the „Contra‟ armed groups, and they had established themselves after the war of the 
1980s and the loss of Sandinista power as locally powerful entrepreneurs, especially active in 
cattle fattening and export of live animals to Honduras. Some were originally engaged in timber 
exploitation; with a legal ban on pine exploitation in 2005, however, many of them reconverted 
to    cattle  trade  (often  contraband).  In  this,  some  of  them  functioned  as  local  patrons  in 
Sandinista  networks,  while  others  were  managing  liberal  clientelistic  networks,  all  of  them 
mediating  influence  and  access  to  resources  and  opportunities  from  different  institutions. 
Concurrently, the Sandinista president, Daniel Ortega had returned to power
[29], such that the 
local balance of power between Sandinista and Liberal networks (through their crucial links with 
„their‟  government)  was  shifting  and  creating  new  expectations  among  Sandinistas, 
expectations that re-united several gatekeepers to take advantage from the new government.  
 
With  the  return  of  Daniel  Ortega,  the  sales  of  contraband    cattle  to  Honduras 
dropped  ,  just  when  legal  cross-border    trade  of  live  cattle  was  impeded  by  new  trade 
regulations.  Both factors contributed to repayment problems of the chain of  entrepreneurs 
connected  to  these  cattle  operations.  Procredit  and  Banex  reacted  with  judicial  action  (as 
dictated by the Financial authorities‟ regulations), trying to confiscate properties and cattle. As 
some of the pledged branded cattle had already disappeared to Honduras –technically speaking 
a  fraudulent  act-  some  clients  were  put  in  jail.  Anyone  with  insight  into    Nicaraguan  power 
relations, however, knows that you cannot strip local patrons, protected by Sandinista or  Liberal 
networks,  from  their  property  and  even  less  from  their  physical  liberty  unpunished.  The  ex-
mayor of Jalapa, himself not a debtor, but a skilful political entrepreneur (and himself at the time 
                                                           
[27] The official name of the „Non Payment Movement‟ is the „Movement of Producers and Traders of the 
North‟, indicating that it initially was a geographically confined initiative, spreading to most of the country 
afterwards. 
[28] Current estimates of the FDL and ASOMIF indicate that the Sandinistas represent the majority party 
influence in the Non-payment Movement.  As one producer put it: “The real majority of the Non Payment 
Movement are cattle raisers”. Among the Sandinistas there are two groups: 1) those who have become 
professionals for the movement and for whom political opportunism is more important than their income as 
cattle raisers and 2) cattle raisers who remain in the movement for opportunistic reasons in the hopes that 
being  part  of  the  Sandinista  movement  will  pay  off  in  terms  of  not  having  to  pay  or  access  to  other 
subsidies.  
[29] In a sense, the Sandinistas never were out of power.  After their unexpected electoral defeat in 1990, 
Daniel Ortega promised to construct a “government from below with the people”. What in fact happened 
was that the Sandinistas built a government “below the table and beyond the law” buying influences and 
blackmailing individuals to control key State apparatuses. This control bolsters the clientelistic schemes of 
the  Sandinistas.  In  our  view,  this  background  sets  them  aside  from  most  other  clientelistic  “new  left” 
governments in Latin America.  
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accused  of  corruption  during  his  reign)  saw  this  situation  as  an  opportunity  to  mobilize  the 
Sandinista network against all the „MFI-usurers‟ who were accused of threatening to steal away 
the  land,  houses  and  even  the  personal  liberty  from  the  „poor‟  in  order  to  safeguard  their 
excessive profits from allegedly „illegal credit operations‟. Through their patronage networks it is 
not  difficult  to  mobilize  and  in  the  context  of  increasing  repayment  problems  due  to  the 
economic downturn, they managed with relative ease to mobilize the Sandinista bases. This 
mobilizing capacity is precisely also the political currency with which they start to negotiate their 
relations  with  the  new  Sandinista  authorities,  who  are  keen  on  strengthening  their  support 
network in order to consolidate their power after having won the 2007 election with only 38 per 
cent of the votes
[30].  
 
With  the  support  of  a  number  of  local  members  of  parliament  (from  different 
political sides) this leads to a first negotiation in Nueva Segovia with the MFIs from Asomif, 
Banex and Procredit. Invoking their status as MFI-banks,  they initially did not want to negotiate; 
their slogan was „sed lex, dura lex‟. Nevertheless, they found themselves forced to attend these 
meetings  with  the  Non  Payment  Movement.  An  initial  agreement  is  reached  about  the 
restructuring of pending debts over a five-year period for those who want, at the cost of  losing 
their access rights  to future loans. However, the agreement was never implemented, because 
Daniel  Ortega  during  a  visit  to  the  region  in  June  2008  torpedoed  it.  According  to  some 
observers, he was attempting to deviate attention away from local discontent about the failure of 
the new government to deliver promised seeds and fertilizers for the upcoming planting season. 
Others maintain that he was misinformed, when he called upon the Sandinista public present in 
the meeting not to protest his government, but to turn to the streets to protest directly against 
the MFI-usurers
[31]. This leads to a second confrontation in Nueva Segovia, including a strike of  
the MFIs in the region. New fuel for the Non-Payment Movement comes with the outbreak of the 
national economic and debt crisis in 2009. Possibly also because of discordance between a 
more radical, political and a more moderate entrepreneurial wing of the Sandinista party, the 
government was quite ambiguous in discourse and negotiations, but the radical position often 
held the day on what happened on the ground. There is only seldom open support for the Non-
Payment Movement, but at the same time very little is done in practice to avoid or stop the often 
violent protests and aggressions against MFIs. Furthermore, in March 2010 the Parliament and 
later also the President approve a Law, demanded by the Non-Payment Movement, installing a 
temporary repayment moratorium and a compulsory five year restructuration at an 18% interest 
rate
[32].  In June 2010, a new solution seemed to emerge when ASOMIF and the government 
concluded a formal agreement, including promises to support repayment culture in exchange for 
                                                           
[30] Probably, it was also an interesting bargaining chip for the leader of the Non Payment Movement, 
when  facing  the  politicized  Nicaraguan  courts,  where  he  has  to  defend  himself  against  allegations  of 
corruption (and from which he is absolved in the course of 2010).  
[31] Literally he said the following: “I told you to protest, to make demands; I understand your demands, 
because it is not easy to break the chains imposed by the governments of the oligarchy and the Empire in 
only one year and six months. They have chained us from all sides….  You have done well to protest 
against the usurers, but instead of protesting on the roads you would better protest in front of the usurers 
themselves; go posting in front of their offices. Be firm, we will support you. (El Nuevo Diario, 13 juli 2008). 
[Note: All Citations in Spanish have been translated to English by the authors. ]  One day later the office of 
the MFI Fundenuse was put to fire.  
[32] Today, it is clear however that the impact of this strongly contested law (both by the MFIs and their 
international  funders)  has  been  quite  limited  in  practice,  either  because  clients  preferred  to  opt  for  a 
separate restructuring (which would not bar them from future access), or because they never intended to 
pay anyway.  
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responsible  MFI  practices    (conditions  to  be  included  in  a  new  microfinance  Law  that  was 
promised). Also this formal agreement remains dead letter and even the formal promise to strive 
for a new microfinance law in the November 2010 Letter of Intent with the IMF did not produce 
the long awaited settlement. In the meantime, the leader of the Non-Payment Movement did 
offer his support for the contested re-election of Daniel Ortega, promising him the votes of his 
followers  (La  Prensa,  17  December  2010).    In  the  current  climate  before  the  November 
elections;  the promise made to followers in the circles of the Non Payment Movement is that, 
once re-elected, Daniel Ortega‟s government will take over their debts. 
 
It  is  self-evident  that  the  protests,  chaos  and  violence  of  the  Non-Payment 
Movement is a very negative, compounding factor in the Nicaraguan microfinance crisis and 
today does not contribute at all to a quick reestablishment of a repayment culture, and even less 
to the confidence of foreign investors in the Nicaraguan microfinance industry. The discursive 
struggle with their clientelistic networks remains a significant challenge for several weaker MFIs 
with  a  declining  portfolio  due  to  a  lack  of  fresh  international  funding,  impeding  necessary 
promises to honor future loan applications of clients with  a good  record. If nothing changes in 
this context, it can therefore be feared that more of the weaker MFIs will have to be foreclosed. 
Ultimately this does not seem to be a very favorable perspective for the protesting clients either, 
given  the  drastic  decline  in  the  supply  of  credit.
[33]  Furthermore,  it  seems  to  hurt  the  poor 
relatively more since they turn out to have less access to the alternative sources. An internal 
letter of the Non-Payment leader from January 2010 makes it very clear however that at least 
for a part of the movement (and its political supporters in government circles) the main purpose 
was to destroy the private microfinance sector, or at least to weaken it to such an extent as to 
facilitate direct political control over its operations. This could be achieved by the expansion of 
operations of the public-sandinista initiatives, in particular  ALBA-Caruna and the new state 
development bank Produzcamos (El Nuevo Diario, 5 January 2010). Even when the latter –
possibly also under pressure from the IADB which despite its ideological opposition to state 
banking committed 20 million US$ of fresh resources to it- tries to profile itself as a serious, 
professional new-style public financial institution and openly pledges not to fall back into the old 
disease of political, clientelistic favoritism (and disastrous repayment performance). The leader 
of the Non-Payment movement nevertheless seems to feel confident in the face of government 
pledges to safeguard and strengthen the culture of repayment. Confronted with the discourse of 
the  technicians  of  Produzcamos  that  they  would  not  lend  to  people  without  a  clean  credit 
history,  he  confidently  stated  that  the  Moratorium  Law  actually  enabled  members  of  the 
movement to clean their historical credit record and thus have access to Produzcamos. And he 
expressively added “This thus does not worry us, we know what the rules of the game in this 
country are” (La Prensa, 28 January 2010, emphasis added).  
 
The political core in all this lies with a fundamentally political assessment of the 
socio-economic networks around existing MFIs. At least by some, these seem to be viewed as 
(potentially) dangerous autonomous social spaces with only limited Sandinista influence and 
control. Entirely in line with the strategy of the former, corrupt liberal president Alemán (today a 
de facto ally of Ortega), the Sandinista party tries to (re)build and strengthen local patronage 
networks through the channeling of generous support (including economic resources) towards 
                                                           
[33] See our analysis of this problem in sections 1 and 2. Especially the declines in the portfolio of the 
smaller MFIs has hurt and will continue to hurt small rural producers, even those who did not participate in 
the Non Payment Movement.    
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local patrons, such as the leaders of the Non-Payment Movement as well as all kinds of social 
advantages for the dependent, poor „clients‟, often financed through the private Nicaraguan-
Venezuelan joint venture ALBANISA. Sandinista controlled credit provisioning is a very useful 
political tools in this endeavour, while a network of private MFIs with all too autonomous clients 
working  within  market-type  transactions  seems  to  be  viewed  as  a  potential  threat  for  the 
consolidation  of  the  Sandinista  project.    On  a  fundamental  level,  this  is  also  linked  to  the 
underlying structural „socialist‟ economic project of the new Sandinista government. In line with 
its 1980s developmentalist modernization strategy (Bastiaensen, 1988), this project rejects the 
development of a broad sector of autonomous small and medium-sized rural enterprises and 
tries to establish a close, politically controlled alliance between the relevant state institutions, 
cooperatives, federations of cooperatives and large scale ALBANISA processing and trading 
enterprises who substitute for the state enterprises during the first Sandinista reign and whose 
private profits should also finance a kind of semi-public solidarity and redistribution (the so-
called Bono Solidario of the president)
[34]. The big practical problem with this strategy is that –at 
least for the time being- the Sandinista government does not possess sufficient funding and 
technical human capacity  to replace the private MFIs to a sufficient degree. Therefore, and 
again at least for the time being, there still remains space for the recuperation of the sector, in 
particular  for    regulated  MFI-banks  whom  as  capitalist  enterprises  –through  the  excellent 
relationships  of  the  Sandinistas  with  the  dominant  private  entrepreneurs  of  COSEP-  are 
paradoxically  better  protected  than  the  non-regulated  MFIs  from  attempts  of  Sandinista 
interference
[35].   
   
                                                           
[34] On a pragmatic level, this change avoids the necessity to privatise formal state property if political 
power were to be lost as had happened during the so-called „piñata‟ after the unexpected electoral defeat 
of the Sandinistas in 1990. Further changes with respect to the revolutionary period of the 1980s are an 
increased respect for macro-economic equilibria and market forces, which also allow for a more workable 
alliance with the non-Sandinista private sector, amply benefiting from similar privileges as the ALBANISA 
enterprises.  Of course, and despite abundant anti-imperialistic rhetoric, also the geopolitical context is 
quite different and has enabled the Sandinista government to largely avoid confrontation with the U.S.  
[35] This therefore is also a reason why non-regulated MFI opt to transform into a regulated MFI-bank. 
Similar dynamics are observed in Ecuador and Bolivia (Bédécarrats, Doligez & Bastiaensen, forthcoming).  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
 
We can conclude that the Non-Payment Movement could indeed be viewed as a 
kind  of  Polanyian  countermovement  in  the  sense  that  it  represents  a  reaction  from  society 
against  the  working  of  the  microfinancial  market.  The  key  problem  is  however  that  this 
countermovement is generated from within authoritarian-clientelistic socio-political structures, 
which are closely related to the fundamental institutional core of the unequal and segmented 
development of rural Nicaragua.  The all too narrow commercial focus on finance only and the 
lack  of  deeper  social  embeddedness  of  the  private  microfinance  sector  clearly  weakens  its 
bargaining  power  and  persuasiveness  in  the  discursive  struggle  for  local  legitimacy.  Clients 
(and in particular poor clients) actually have to chose between an option for a potential pathway 
of autonomy through honoring their contractual obligations (gaining and maintaining a kind of 
market  citizenship),  or  a  Faustian  deal  with  the  dominant  groups  where  they  trade  their 
independence  for  short  term  survival  and  advantages.  In  this  perspective,  it  is  perhaps  a 
hopeful sign that the Non-Payment Movements according to their own information have only 
managed to organize about 20,000 clients out of the more than 500,000 clients in total. Success 
with  the  development  of  transformative  microfinance,  coupled  to  economic  and  social 
democratization and articulated with complementary services, could turn the balance even more 
against old-style political control in the future. Today, those MFIs who chose for such a strategy 
may  however  find  themselves  between  the  Scylla  of  finance  as  a  business  without  much 
concern  for  development  or  the  Charybdis  of  political,  clientelistic  state-led  finance  mostly 
favoring the interests of the old and new entrepreneurial elites. From this perspective, it is not 
impossible that Nicaragua ends up with a peaceful co-existence between these two forms of 
state and  private commercial banking. The question will be how much space  the poor in rural 
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